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PETITIONER THE UPJOHN COMPANY'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING TO CLARIFY HOLDING
COMES NOW petitioner, The Upjohn Company

(hereinafter

"Upjohn") , pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing for
the limited purpose of clarifying the holding in its opinion of
May 14, 1991 ("Slip op.") . Although this Court held that plaintiffs
in this civil action for personal injury involving an FDA approved
prescription drug could not proceed on a theory of design defect,
the United States District Court Judge has interpreted this Court's
opinion of May 14, 1991 to allow plaintiffs to proceed to trial on
a strict liability design defect theory. Clarification is necessary
and would

benefit these litigants, the Tenth Circuit Court of

Appeals when and if it reviews the rulings of the District Court
Judge, and future litigants in Utah.
I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Respondents

(hereinafter

"plaintiffs")

commenced

this

civil action against Upjohn, alleging that Mildred Lucille Coats
died at age 83

from gunshot wounds

Ilo Grundberg, on June 19, 1988.
personal

representative

of

inflicted by her daughter,

Grundberg and Janice Gray, the

Coats1

estate, brought

this

action

alleging that Grundberg shot her mother as the result of ingesting
the drug Halcion, a prescription drug approved by the United States
Food

and

Drug Administration

for the short-term management of

insomnia.
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Plaintiffs' Complaint stated several causes of action,
including common law negligence, strict liability and breach of
express and implied warranty.

Upjohn challenged a number of

plaintiffs1

for partial

claims

by

motions

summary

judgment.

Judgment was entered for Upjohn on all plaintiffs' breach of
warranty

claims.

Order

of

October 17,

manufacturing defect claim was dismissed.
1990.

1990.

Plaintiffs'

Order of December 19,

Plaintiffs did not plead an independent cause of action for

fraud on the FDA.

Transcript of Proceedings, April 15, 1991.

At the time questions were certified to this Court,
plaintiffs were scheduled for trial on their failure to warn claim.
Slip op. at 2.
design

defect

The availability to plaintiffs at trial of their
theory

depended

on this Court's resolution of

certified questions. Id.
Upon certification, this Court specifically addressed
the

question

of whether Utah adopts the

"unavoidably unsafe

products" exception to strict products liability as set forth in
comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
On May 14, 1991, this Court held that all FDA-approved prescription
medications are "unavoidably unsafe."

This Court further held

that manufacturers of unavoidably dangerous products should not be
liable for a claim of design defect.
In light of the strong public interest in
the availability and af f ordability of
prescription medications, the extensive
regulatory system of the FDA, and the avenues
of recovery still available to plaintiffs by
claiming inadequate warning, mismanufacture,
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improper marketing, or misrepresentation of
information to the FDA, we conclude that a
broad grant of immunity from strict liability
claims based on design defects should be
extended to FDA-approved prescription drugs in
Utah.
Slip op. at 16.
On May 24, 1991, a hearing was held in the United States
District Court to discuss the impact of this Court's holding on
the trial of this action.

The United States District Court Judge

interpreted this Court's opinion, and denied Upjohn's motion for
partial summary judgment on plaintiffs' design defect claim:
Court: . . . The motion for partial summary
judgment as to the strict liability claim is
denied.
And the matters of mismarketing,
failure to warn, misrepresentation to the FDA
and defective design as it is indicated may be
presented as a matter of evidence under that
theory.
Proceedings of May 24, 1991, at 2, attached as Appendix A.
The United States District Court Judge explained further
his interpretation of this Court's opinion:
Court: . . . I think we may need to talk about
jury instructions and how they are going to be
presented but within the discussion of the
Supreme Court ruling, I consider that the broad
discussion of defect would include design
defect.
That is to say, if what the Supreme Court said
about product defects, there is a mutually
exclusive 3 part definition, and that includes
the universe, manufacturing, design and
inadequate warnings.
I do not intend to limit this case to inadequate
warnings; it certainly is not going to include
manufacturing flaws. It follows that it is
within the purview of design defects.
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And when the Supreme Court talks about the
matter of defective or unreasonably dangerous
product as related to the 4 or 5 matters that
have been identified including mismarketing,
misinformation to the FDA, inadequate warning
and manufacturing flaws, that within that I
think is the kind of design defect I'm talking
about is embraced.
(emphasis added).
II.

Id., at 3-4.

RELIEF REQUESTED
Upjohn submits that when this Court expressly reached

"the same conclusion as did the California Supreme Court in Brown"
(Slip

op.

at 10),

this

Court

held

that

plaintiffs

in this

prescription drug case should be allowed to proceed to trial for
failure to adequately warn, under the standard enunciated by this
Court in Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah,
1984).

The United States District Court, however, has interpreted

this Court's opinion of May 14, 1991 to allow plaintiffs to proceed
on a strict liability theory allowing for the admission of "design
defect" evidence.
Upjohn respectfully

submits that this Court's well-

reasoned analysis of the public policy of the State of Utah
regarding prescription drug manufacturer liability could not and
should not have resulted in the interpretation given to this Court's
opinion.

The Upjohn Company respectfully requests the Court to

clarify the holding in its opinion to make clear that liability
against

a

prescription

drug

manufacturer
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focuses

on

the

manufacturer's failure to communicate information to prescribing
physicians, not on some theory of design defect.
III. ARGUMENT
A.

There f is Seemingly an Ambiguity in this
Court s Opinion

This Court's opinion holds that plaintiffs could proceed
to trial on their failure to warn claims and that liability may be
imposed according to the standard enunciated in Barson v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984). Support for Upjohn's
interpretation is found throughout the opinion.

First, at page 2

of the slip opinion, the Court stated as follows:
Plaintiffs claim that Upjohn failed to
adequately warn about certain adverse side
effects of Halcion and that Halcion was
defectively designed.
The failure to warn
claim is scheduled for trial.
The strict
liability claim based on design defect is the
subject of Upjohn's pending summary judgment
motion, the outcome of which depends on this
Court's resolution of the certified question.
(emphasis added).

Although plaintiffs had alleged both a failure

to warn and a design defect claim, this Court clearly understood
that its ruling would determine whether plaintiffs could proceed to
trial on both theories. This Court went on to hold that plaintiffs
could not proceed on a design defect theory.
Further

support

for Upjohn's

Slip op. at 10.

interpretation

Court's holding is found at page 10 of the slip opinion.
this Court stated:
We agree with the principle comment k embodies,
that manufacturers of unavoidably dangerous
products should not be liable for a claim of
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of this
There,

design defect.
We are persuaded that all
prescription drugs should be classified as
unavoidably dangerous in design because of
their unique nature and value, the elaborate
regulatory system overseen by the FDA, the
difficulties of relying on individual lawsuits
as a forum in which to review a prescription
drug's design, and the significant public policy
considerations noted in Brown. We, therefore,
reach the same conclusion as did the Supreme
Court in Brown, albeit pursuant to a slightly
different rationale.
(emphasis added).
In Brown, the California

Supreme Court addressed the

very issues presented here, and stated:
While there is some disagreement as to its
scope and meaning, there is a general consensus
that, although it purports to explain the strict
liability doctrine, in fact the principle it
states is based on negligence. * * * That is,
comment k would impose liability on a drug
manufacturer only if it failed to warn of a
defect of which it either knew or should have
known. This concept focuses not on a deficiency
in the product —
the hallmark of strict
liability — but on the fault of the producer
in failing to warn of dangers inherent in the
use of its product that were either known or
knowable — an idea which "rings of negligence,"
751 P.2d at 476.
Notwithstanding

the

seemingly

clear

language

of this

Court's opinion, the United States District Court Judge interprets
this Court's opinion to hold that if plaintiffs simply allege
"mismarketing"

or

proceed

strict

defect."

on

a

"misinformation
liability

to

the

FDA," plaintiffs may

theory, which

includes

"design

Upjohn respectfully suggests that this is not what this

Court held or intended.
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United States Magistrate Judge Ronald Boyce was recently
apprised of the District Court Judge's interpretation of the May 14,
1991 opinion.

His comments demonstrate that two federal jurists

in Utah read this Court's holding differently:
Plaintiffs' counsel (reading to the Magistrate Judge
the ruling of the District Court Judge): " . . .
The motion for partial summary judgment as to
strict liability claim is denied.
And the
matters of mismarketing, comma, failure to
warn, comma, misrepresentation to the FDA, and
defect in design, as it is indicated, may be
presented as a matter of evidence under that
theory." . . .
Magistrate Judge: I'll tell you what troubles me in
that language is the term "misdesign." Is it —
Upjohn's Counsel:

Defective design.

Magistrate Judge:
Defective design.
That as I
read the Utah Supreme Court is just not Utah
law.
Transcript of Proceedings, May 31, 1991, at 72-73, attached as
Appendix B.
The United States District Court Judge's interpretation
and the Magistrate Judge's comments make it clear that there is a
need for clarification of the holding in this Court's opinion of
May 14, 1991. This Court did not intend by its opinion of May 14,
1991 to allow plaintiffs to proceed on a strict liability theory
which allows plaintiffs to present a case for design defect.
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B.

The Opinion Should Be Clarified to State
That Plaintiffs Can Proceed on Their
Failure to Warn Claim.

This Court acknowledged that trial courts are poorly
suited

to

address

the

"polycentric"

prescription drug design defect claim.

problem

presented

Slip op. at 16.

by

a

The

benefits to society in promoting the development, availability,
and reasonable price of drugs justify the approach of denying
plaintiffs the theory of design defect.

Id.

This Court has so

ruled.
Plaintiffs were scheduled for trial on their failure to
warn claim.

Upjohn anticipated that this Court's holding that

plaintiffs had no design defect claim would result in the grant of
summary judgment on that claim.
this Court too anticipated

Upjohn respectfully suggests that

its ruling would have such affect.

Slip op. at 2. At a minimum, clarification would facilitate further
review of the District Court Judge's ruling in the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, Upjohn requests that this Court's holding
in the opinion of May 14, 1991 be clarified by the addition of the
following paragraph:
Accordingly, there is no claim for design defect
in a civil action for personal injuries
involving FDA approved prescription drugs, and
no evidence of design defect should be admitted
in such a case involving an FDA approved
prescription drug.

IV.

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE,

for

these

reasons,

The

Upjohn

Company

respectfully requests that this Court grant rehearing for the
limited purpose of clarifying its holding in the opinion of May 14,
1991 in accord with the particulars identified herein.
Dated this

day of June, 1991.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

<T&mify^.^

By

Merlin 0. Bak%fr (A0180)
Thomas L. Kay (A1778)
Steven J. Aeschbacher (A4527)
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-03358
(801) 532-1500
SHOOK, JIARDY & BAQ^N

By

Aiohy^

<jQ.

Lane D. Bauer
Laura D. Stith
Stephen E. Scheve
One Kansas City Place
1200 Main Street, 27th Floor
Kansas City, Missouri 64105
(816) 474-6550
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER
THE UPJOHN COMPANY
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
I

certify

that the

foregoing

Petitioner

The Upjohn

Company's Petition for Rehearing to Clarify Holding is filed in
good faith and not for purpose of delay.
Attorney for Petitioner
The Upjohn Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the / nV\ day of June, 1991, four
true and correct copies of PETITIONER THE UPJOHN COMPANY'S PETITION
FOR REHEARING TO CLARIFY HOLDING were mailed, postage prepaid, to
the following:
C. Neal Pope
POPE, McGLAMRY, KILPATRICK & MORRISON
83 Walton Street
P.O. Box 1733
Atlanta, Georgia 30301
and one copy to:
H. Ross Workman
WORKMAN, NYDEGGER & JENSEN
1000 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondents

orney for
Petite
Attorney
ror petitioner
The Upjohn Company

10404850
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APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
- o O i i-

4

ILO GRUNDBERG,

S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h
Date:
May 2 4 , 1.991
Time:
9:30 a.m.

Plaintiff,

5
6

[vs.

7

[THE UPJOHN COMPANY,

8

Case No. C89-274

Defendant.

9
10
11

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
BEFORE

THE HONORABLE J . THOMAS GREENE

12

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:

13

For the Plaintiff:

NEAL POPE, ESQ. ,
STEVEN SACCOCIA, ESQ. and
DANIEL SIGELMAN, ESQ.

For the Defendant:

LANE BAUER, ESQ.,
THOMAS KAY, ESQ.,
STEPHEN SCHEVE, ESQ. and
ROB McCULLY, ESQ.

Court Reporter:

REEVE M. BUTLER, RPR
Official Court Reporter
Rm. 224 Federal Bldg.
350 S. Main Street
Salt Lake City, Ut

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Tel. 328-0837

THE COURT:

1

All right.

With respect to this matter

2

I notice in the pleadings in this case on strict liability,

3

Count 2/ there is incorporated in I lie previous pleaiiinq, which

4

specifically has to do with willful and fraudulent

5

[misrepresentation of information I n th»~ Food an>i Drug

6

(Administration.

7

There is M I so reference to i te fecit i ve <. ondjtion,

8

unreasonably dangerous, defective packaging, false, misleading

9

advertising!, defective-' warnings and instruct ions.-, and

10

(marketing.
The motion for partial summary judgment as to the

11
12

strict liability claim is denied.

13

bismarketing, failure to warn, misrepresentation to the FDA

14

and defective design as it is indicated may be presented as a

15

(matter of evidence under that theory.

16
17

Now it's 1.1:30.
1.

MR. POPE:

19

MR. SCHEVE:

21

Would you like to take a quick

,• : , -

18

20

And the matters of

Let's do that, Your Honor.
Did you say evidence of defective

|design, Your Honor, is admissible?
THE COURT:

Yes.

If you want to take * quick lunch

22

Iwe can come back at 12:30 or we can go on for an hour now but

23

\L suggest that we do that.

24
25

Let's take a break and I know that some of you would
CLike to get out soon.

I've indicated we'll be through no

later than 4:30, W e may need that much time.

If w e don't

|we'l] qet out sooner but let's resume at quarter to one.
We're in recess until then.
(Recess w a s taken)
THE COURT:

M r . Bauer,

MR. BAUER:

Your Honor, not being quite as sharp as

[these young legal eagles, ;o\iU 1 .is'l-' f-n

1 ar i t" icat j on of

k^our ruling at the end of this morning if 1 could state it so
[that I can understand :i t as tc : • whei -e wp're going.
Your Honor, if I understood you correctly, you ruled
-L-L

hat evidence *• -. *
failure to Ki^rr

-.

:,

misleading the FDA - ;*n paraphrasing these
-- '

Iconcer •-••
[Honor rule

.. •* "\*

-

u a .our

i, understood .*o- ;:? nc. r.;fc<= tr. effect that at

1 *• <

: y a separate

[theory of design defect under either negligence or strict
jliabi ] I t:;r

Am 1 :::oi: r ec t i i i tl la t assumption Your Honor?
THE COURT:

bojnt-.

Well

i think W P \W\\ nee

don't think 1 reached that exact
about jury instructions

(and how they are 90111. t.- ;* presented but within the
•--

-->

vulmg

I consider that the

£>road discussion • : defect would include design defect.
• e Supreme Court said about
broduct defects, there is a mutually exclusive 3 part
pefinit 10

id that includes the universe, manufacturing,

1

design and inadequate warnings,
I do not intend to limit this case t o inadequate

2
3

warnings; it certainly is not going to include manufacturing

4

flaws.

5

defects.

6

It follows that it is with i n t h e pi ix v\:l e% of design

And when t h e Supreme Con lr t t:a ] k. =J a bou t: t h e matter of

7

[defective or unreasonably dangerous product as related to the

8

4 o r 5 matters that h.ivp bpen identified

inrLudinq

[mismarketing, misinformation t the FDA, inadequate warning
- <-

s

and manufacti n:

11

of design defect . n talking about is embraced.

12

MR

*

• * •-*': 1 th I i lk :i s t h e k i n d

1U

•'-•":'

::-

13

:\ *

I.

(Excerpt concluded)

14

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
[STATE OF UTAH

)
)

[COUNTY OJ S Z 1 ,T I A KE
17

)

I, REEVE M. BUTLER, d ,« hereby certify that I am

18

Ian OftLcial Court:. Reporter' loi; the United States District

19

(Court for the District of Utah;

20

That, as such Reporter I attended the hearing of

21

jthe foregoing matter on / ^^^j/^^f/f^^/1

22

[reporte<1 in • tenui ypn nil ol the1 testimony and proceedings

23

pad, and caused said notes to be transcribed into typewriting;

24

(and the f oi/ecjoi ntj pages numbered from j ^ s ^ t o (^

25

[constitute a full, true and correct report o f t h e same.

and thereat

1
2

DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, thi

w

U^K~1991.

3
4

'*<j%
REEVE M

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

BUTLER, RPR

day of

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
-oOOILO MARIE GRUNDBERG,
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as personal representative of
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TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING
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THE UPJOHN COMPANY, a
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-0O0BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 31st day of May, 1991,
the Hearing in the above-entitled action now pending before
the above-named Court, was heard by the Honorable Ronald N.
Boyce, United States Magistrate, commencing at the hour of
1:40 p.m. of said day, at the united States District
Courthourse, Second Floor, 350 South Main Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah.

CERTIFIED
COPY

SANDRA GARDINER
C8R HO. 298

INDEPENDENT REPORTING
SERVICE
Certified Shorthand Reporter*

1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
SahLakeCm Utah M m
{601) 533-2333

1 necessarily especially in 1973, with any known hypothesis, but
2 what you're going to find with respect to unusual toxicity.
3 So if you find in a very high percentage of patients on the
4 drug, particularly compared with placebo, very untoward
5 effects, you have prospective experience, which is markedly
6 different from retrospective analysis with drug experience, of
7 course.
8

THE COURT:

I think that, Mr. Sigelman, your argument

9 would make significantly greater impression if you still had
10 in this case a fraud on the FDA in obtaining approval.

Then

11 the question of whether there had been a failure to adequately
12 control the experiment, failure to properly report data, or
13 withholding of information, all of that relevant to the
14 clinical trial would be significant.

As I understand the

15 negligence issue that is before the Court now, it is not
16 negligence in the submissions to the FDA.

That's foreclosed

17 by the Utah Supreme Court's decision and is the negligence in
18 the marketing, negligence in the information that's being
19 communicated concerning the use of the drug.
20

MR. SIGELMAN:

Your Honor, i£ I may say so, that is not

21 the case.
22

THE COURT:

Okay.

23

MR. SIGELMAN:

First of all, on April 15, 1991, in

24 discussing defendant's objections to the plaintiff's claims in
25 the pretrial order, and this is in our response to their
70

Sandra Gardiner, Certified Shorthand Reporter

1 submission to Your Honor, wherein plaintiffs requested
2 sanctions and we provided you a copy, Judge Greene held three
3 things with regard to plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentation
4 theories.

One, they come in under plaintiff's negligent

5 claims, in fact, which Mr. Scheve effectively admitted during
6 the two days of case management in mid-April.
7

THE COURT:

But isn't it negligence with reference to

8 the marketing of the drug?
9

MR. SIGELMAN:

No, it's negligent misrepresentations to

10 the Food and Drug Administration which involve mismarketing
11 and misinformation.

Secondly, he ruled that we can bring in

12 the same kind of evidence in the same kinds of claims under
13 our punitive damages count.

And then he ruled at that time

14 that we could bring it in under the exception to the
15 exception.
16

Now Your Honor's referenced

THE COURT:

—

Now the exception to the exception is

17 essentially a fair marketing, fair notice claim.
18

MR. SIGELMAN:

It was more than that, Your Honor.

19 also involved misinformation to the FDA.

It

It involved

20 misrepresentation to the FDA, as well as mismarketing.

Judge

21 Greene found we could come in under all those things.

And, in

22 fact, Your Honor, if you look at the Utah Supreme Court
23 opinion, where they talk about the exception under Comment K,
24 they have a whole line of different points of the opinion as
25 to what constitutes exceptions.

And they're all divided by
71

Sandra Gardiner, Certified Shorthand Reporter

1 commas.

You have failure to word, comma, you have

2 misinformation, comma, you have mismarketing, comma.
3

THE COURT:

It's

—

Now the information as I understand it, the

4 Utah Supreme Court, they did not know whether fraud upon the
5 FDA on misinformation to the FDA was a factor in the case.
6 And they just said, "We're not excluding this as a possible
7 claim."

That would obviate the Unreasonably Unsafe Drug

8 Standard of 402(a).
9 someone could claim.

We're just saying this is something that
But they weren't saying that remained a

10 life issue in this case.
11

MR. SIGELMAN:

Okay.

Your Honor, if I may, Mr.

12 Tomlinson has handed me part of the transcript from our May
13 24, 1991 hearing before Judge Greene.
14

THE COURT:

15

MR. SIGELMAN:

Okay.
And the Court at —

in this part of the

16 transcript states, quote, "With respect to this matter, I
17 notice in the pleadings in this case in strict liability count
18 two, there is incorporated in the previous pleading, which
19 specifically has to do with willful and fraudulent
20 misrepresentation of information to the Food and Drug
21 Administration.

There is also reference to a defective

22 condition, unreasonably dangerous defective packaging, false,
23 misleading advertising, defective warnings and instructions in
24 marketing.

The motion for partial summary judgment as to

25 strict liability claim is denied.

And the matters of
72

Sandra Gardiner, Certified Shorthand Reporter

1 mismarketing, comma, failure to warn, comma, misrepresentation
2 to the FDA, and defective design, as it is indicated, may be
3 presented as a matter of evidence under that theory."
4

So, Your Honor, I would respectfully submit that Judge

5 Greene has ruled, as of the 16th or the 24th of May, that one
6 of the elements under which plaintiffs are permitted to
7 proceed at trial with evidence under the exception to the
8 exception, under Comment K, is with respect to
9 misrepresentation to the FDA.
10

THE COURT:

I'll tell you what troubles me in that

11 language is the term "misdesign".
12

MR. KAY:

13

THE COURT:

Is it

—

Defective design.
Defective design.

That as I read the Utah

14 Supreme Court is just not Utah law.
15

MR. SIGELMAN:

Well, the Utah Supreme Court said that

16 if, in exchange for the immunity they were giving under
17 Comment K, a company provides misinformation to the FDA,
18 mismarkets a drug, etc., the product becomes defective.

And

19 what Judge Greene held was that the universe of what can
20 happen is really a tripartite universe.

And Judge Greene held

21 in this transcript, and I quote, "Well, I don't think I'd
22 reach that at that point.

I think we may need to talk about

23 jury instructions and how they are going to be presented.

But

24 within the discussion of the Supreme Court ruling, I
25 considered that the broad discussion of defect would exclude
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